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mandate the vaccine against human papilloma virus (HPV), the virus that can cause cervical cancer. Public
health ethics so far has failed to facilitate meaningful dialogue between the opposing sides. When stripped of
its emotional charge, the debate can be framed as a contest between competing ethical values. This framework
can be conceptualized graphically as a conflict between autonomy on the one hand, which militates against
government intrusion, and beneficence, utilitarianism, justice, and nonmaleficence on the other, which may
lend support to intervention. When applied to the HPV vaccine, this framework would support a mandate
based on utilitarianism, if certain conditions are met and if herd immunity is a realistic objective.
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A Proposed Ethical Framework for  
Vaccine Mandates: Competing Values  
and the Case of HPV
ABSTRACT. Debates over vaccine mandates raise intense emotions, as reflected 
in the current controversy over whether to mandate the vaccine against human 
papilloma virus (HPV), the virus that can cause cervical cancer. Public health eth-
ics so far has failed to facilitate meaningful dialogue between the opposing sides. 
When stripped of its emotional charge, the debate can be framed as a contest 
between competing ethical values. This framework can be conceptualized graphi-
cally as a conflict between autonomy on the one hand, which militates against 
government intrusion, and beneficence, utilitarianism, justice, and nonmaleficence 
on the other, which may lend support to intervention. When applied to the HPV 
vaccine, this framework would support a mandate based on utilitarianism, if 
certain conditions are met and if herd immunity is a realistic objective.
Debates over vaccine mandates raise intense emotions. This is espe-cially true when schoolchildren are the subjects. A recent rise in the number of children who avoid routine inoculations through 
legal exceptions has alarmed public health advocates, even as the list of 
mandated vaccinations has continued to expand (Omer et al. 2006). Pas-
sionate disputes mark much of the public discourse about when is it ethi-
cally appropriate to compel children to receive medical interventions.
DEBATE OVER MANDATES
Vaccines are among the crowning achievements of medicine (see Com-
mittee on the Evaluation of Vaccine Purchase Financing in the United States 
2003). Childhood diseases that once struck terror in the hearts of parents 
and condemned thousands to lives of pain and suffering, if they even sur-
vived, are now almost forgotten by the public at large. It would be safe 
kennedy institute oF ethiCs journal • june 2008
[  112  ]
to estimate that throughout the course of the twentieth century, millions 
of lives have been saved and incalculable misery averted. However, these 
benefits do not reach large populations unless vaccination is widespread, 
a result that historically has been promoted in the United States through 
mandatory administration.
All states condition school attendance on compliance with a schedule 
of vaccinations. Exceptions are available in all cases for medical reasons, 
such as vaccine allergies, and for religious objections. In some states, ex-
ceptions are also permitted for objections based on broader philosophical 
concerns. Even with these limitations, vaccine mandates engender intense 
opposition to what some see as heavy-handed government compulsion. In 
America, where personal autonomy holds a special place among ethical 
values, many bristle at the thought of implementing medical interventions 
through government coercion.
The conflict between public health imperatives and personal autonomy 
promises to arise with new vigor over proposed mandates for the newly 
approved vaccine against human papilloma virus (HPV), the pathogen that 
can cause cervical cancer. This virus is transmitted through sexual contact, 
and it can remain dormant for several years while an unsuspecting victim 
infects others. If administered before a woman becomes sexually active, the 
vaccine confers immunity to several forms of the virus and can interrupt 
further spread. Proposals to mandate its administration to pre-adolescent 
girls have met concerns not only over individual autonomy and the pos-
sibility of yet to be discovered vaccine side effects, but also over possible 
interference with the sexual attitudes of families.
A vaccine that protects against HPV, Gardasil™ manufactured by 
Merck, was approved by the Food and Drug Administration in June 
2006, and a second one, manufactured by GlaxoSmithKline, Cervarix™, 
is pending approval. Clinical testing indicates that both are free of major 
safety risks, although the possibility of long-term hazards cannot be ruled 
out for any new pharmaceutical product. A key federal policy advisory 
panel, the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices of the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, has recommended that the vaccine 
be administered to all girls at age 11 or 12 (Brown 2006).
The decision to mandate the vaccine as a condition of school attendance, 
as is presently done for numerous routine immunizations, resides with the 
states. Following the FDA approval of Gardasil™, proposals to implement 
such a requirement were considered in 27 states and the District of Co-
lumbia (Kaiser Family Foundation 2008). So far, they have been adopted 
in only two states, Texas and Virginia, and the Texas mandate, which had 
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been implemented through an executive order of the governor, subsequently 
was rescinded after fierce political opposition (see Charo 2007). Neverthe-
less, mandate proposals remain under consideration in several states, where 
they continue to generate considerable controversy.
To a significant extent, the two sides in debates over mandates talk at 
cross-purposes. Public health advocates stress direct benefits to those who 
are vaccinated and indirect protection to whole populations in which dis-
ease-causing agents can be eliminated entirely. To them, these results clearly 
outweigh the risk of possible vaccine side effects that are usually quite rare. 
Mandate opponents emphasize respect for individual preference, which they 
believe should determine whether exposure to risks is tolerated, especially 
when the nature and extent of those risks are subject to dispute.
Public health ethics so far has failed to ground the discussion in a way 
that permits dialogue between the opposing sides (Colgrove 2006). What 
is missing is a common vocabulary that facilitates comparison of the two 
very different sets of concerns. An analytical framework that embodies 
such a vocabulary could reshape disjointed debates into manageable policy 
discussions that may lead to consensus on underlying points. At the least, 
it can lay out competing concerns in an emotionally neutral context that 
encourages more productive public discourse.
FOUNDATION OF AN ETHICAL FRAMEWORK
When stripped of its emotional charge, the debate over vaccine man-
dates can be framed as a contest between competing ethical values (see 
Beauchamp and Childress 2001, pp. 168, 173, 251, 313, for discussion of 
the application of ethical values in the context of vaccination decisions). 
Both sides accept all of these values in isolation. Disagreement arises over 
the primacy of each when they conflict.
In trumpeting autonomy, mandate opponents rely on an ethical pillar 
of the U.S. Constitution (Amendment XIV) and on the foundation in law 
and ethics of a right of competent adults to decline even lifesaving medical 
treatments (Bartling v. Superior Court. 1984. 163 Cal.App.3d 186, 209 
Cal.Rptr. 220 (Cal. App. 2 Dist.)). In essence, autonomy recognizes the 
right of individuals to govern their own behavior. To exercise this right, it 
is necessary to be free from outside influences and limitations, which are 
the essential elements of liberty, and to have the ability to comprehend the 
action to be taken, the alternatives, and the consequences, which are the 
components of agency. Liberty requires, at a minimum, noninterference 
with personal affairs. Agency requires more complex considerations of 
an individual’s capabilities, particularly in the context of health care, as 
kennedy institute oF ethiCs journal • june 2008
[  114  ]
it assumes competence to make a decision. Assessing competence can be 
particularly challenging with regard to adolescents, because of individual 
variations in developmental maturity.
Government by its nature exercises coercive authority. This is the es-
sence of law enforcement. Such coercion violates the right to autonomy 
in the interest of promoting a competing value. A government action of 
this sort can take the form of a restraint on behavior, for example on use 
of illicit drugs, or of a positive compulsion to engage in a behavior, such 
as the acceptance of a vaccine. The ethical challenge in these cases is to 
assess the relative importance of the competing value that is being over-
ridden and of the characteristics and circumstances of those subject to 
the government action.
In seeking to protect public health, mandate advocates rely on the values 
of beneficence, utilitarianism, justice, and nonmaleficence. Beneficence 
is the moral imperative to act for the benefit of others. It is recognized 
as a positive obligation to act in certain circumstances, for example, to 
prevent harm, to help persons with disabilities, and to rescue those in 
danger. Beneficence can be specific to defined categories of individuals, 
such as children, the disabled, or the poor, or it can be a general obligation 
toward all others. In the case of medicine, physicians accept an ethical 
obligation to act with specific beneficence toward patients upon entering 
the profession. General public health programs, such as universal man-
datory vaccination, reflect general beneficence for which the conceptual 
underpinning is somewhat less straightforward.
The application of beneficence to overrule autonomy in the case of 
particular individuals represents paternalism. This describes the attitude 
of a physician who provides or withholds a treatment in contravention of 
a patient’s wishes based on a perception of the patient’s underlying best 
interests. Paternalism reflects an external judgment of the best ultimate 
outcome for the patient.
Utilitarianism takes the external judgment one step further to consider 
the best ultimate outcome for society, as a whole. It implements an ex-
plicit balancing of relevant factors to determine the optimum result for 
the greatest number of people regardless of competing individual needs. 
Utilitarian concerns can be consistent with those of beneficence, but they 
can also conflict, as when the best interests of some individuals are at odds 
with those of the majority.
Utilitarianism supports mandating a vaccine to prevent the harm to 
society that could be caused by the presence of unvaccinated individu-
als. This is the most prominent and longstanding justification put forth 
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by mandate proponents. The Supreme Court relied on this principle in 
upholding a vaccine mandate against smallpox more than 100 years ago, 
setting a precedent that remains in effect today (Jacobson v. Massachusetts. 
1905. 197 U.S. 11). Much of the harm to society results from the loss of 
an effect known as “herd immunity.” Most infectious agents must reside 
in a sufficient number of susceptible individuals to maintain their pres-
ence. Eradication can occur when the proportion of the population that 
has been vaccinated is sufficiently large to deny the infectious agent such 
a reservoir of unimmunized hosts. For most diseases, herd immunity is 
achieved when the proportion of the population vaccinated is in the range 
of 90 percent. When the proportion of vaccine declinations exceeds this 
threshold, the infectious agent can lurk in the population to threaten not 
only those who are unvaccinated but also many who chose the vaccine 
but whose immune systems generate insufficient levels of antibodies to 
confer full protection (May and Silverman 2005).
In this situation, a small number of vaccine declinations can have a 
devastating impact on a community, so the greatest medical benefit for the 
greatest number of people is achieved by requiring that everyone receive 
the vaccine. This is true regardless of whether a mandate is in the best 
interests of every individual or whether it ignores the interest in autonomy. 
It is an example of government coercion in the service of a competing 
ethical consideration. It also reflects an implicit hierarchy of public goods 
in which health takes precedence over rights.
Justice calls for the fair, equitable, and appropriate distribution of scarce 
goods. It requires a reasoned system of allocating resources based on an 
underlying principle such as egalitarianism, fair opportunity, or underlying 
need. Health care is a scarce resource, so justice demands such a system 
for determining access. Under most analyses, relying solely on individual 
wealth to purchase access when life and well-being are at stake would 
not meet the requirements of fairness. Therefore, a program to encour-
age widespread use of a health care resource, such as a vaccine, whether 
through a mandate or otherwise, cannot be just if only those with financial 
means could comply. Justice requires an equitable means of access (see 
Daniels 1985; 2008; Daniels and Sabin 2002).
Nonmaleficence is the directive against inflicting harm on others. It cov-
ers positive actions that hurt others, as well as lack of care that constitutes 
negligence and the imposition of risks of harm. Beneficence subsumes 
an obligation to avoid harm, but nonmaleficence carries an independent 
duty that applies regardless of attempts to create benefits. The principle 
of nonmaleficence would conflict with a vaccine mandate, if the vaccine 
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carries medical risks, as many do. Some recipients would suffer harm to 
their health that would have been avoided but for the mandate.
ETHICAL FRAMEWORK IN GRAPHIC FORM
The issue for public policy, then, is not which value should be respected, 
but how they should be weighed in relation to one another. A framework 
that recognizes this balancing could facilitate a less emotional dialogue and 
focus debates on more clearly defined elements of disagreement, some of 
which may be amenable to resolution through empirical investigation. Such 
a framework can be conceptualized graphically, and it is described below.
The interest in autonomy is most compelling when an individual’s 
behavior causes no harm to him- or herself or to others. It declines as 
actions threaten to cause injury. Refusal of a vaccination causes injury if 
it leads the actor to contract the disease or if it facilitates spread of the 
disease to others. In graphic form, this relationship can be represented 
by a downward sloping line on a graph in which respect for autonomy 
is measured on the y axis and severity of harm from a disease on the x 
axis. In this representation, respect for autonomy declines as the risk of 
harm grows.
The interest in beneficence can be represented with a line that slopes in 
the opposite direction (Figure 1). When the risk of harm from a disease 
is low, there is little need to help those who are susceptible. As the risk 
increases in terms of the severity of the disease, the interest in interven-
ing on their behalf, for example by forcing them to receive a vaccination, 
rises along with it.
Figure 1. Autonomy vs. Beneficence
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A graphic representation of utilitarianism would follow the same trajec-
tory. The imperative to seek the greatest good for a population has little 
relevance in the face of a minimal risk. It rises with the level of potential 
harm, which is a function of both the severity of the illness and the con-
tagiousness of the infectious agent.
A line representing justice would be similar. Mandating a vaccine can 
alleviate disparities in access. It would be difficult to implement or to 
justify a public policy that conditioned school attendance on vaccination, 
if availability of the vaccines involved were restricted. Therefore, vaccine 
mandates trigger several mechanisms that promote universal access. Man-
dated vaccines are recognized as the medical standard of care, which makes 
them eligible for private insurance coverage. For those without insurance, 
public clinics and some schools administer mandated vaccines without 
charge. Coverage also may be available through the federal Vaccines for 
Children Program. As the severity of a disease increases, the interest in 
promoting universal access to a vaccine against it increases as well. This 
raises the importance of justice as the ethical basis for a mandate both in 
absolute terms and in relation to the value of autonomy.
A final ethical consideration is nonmaleficence, the directive to avoid 
harm to others. In the context of a vaccine mandate, such harm would 
take the form of adverse side effects. As a vaccine reaches higher levels of 
safety, the confidence with which its use can be coerced without risking 
harm to patients rises along with it. The concern with protecting autonomy, 
which in this case embodies the right to decide whether to accept a pos-
sible hazard of the vaccine itself, correspondingly declines.
In this graphic scheme, the primary ethical value that militates against 
vaccine mandates and the primary values that militate in favor move along 
lines with opposite slopes. At some point, they cross. To the left of this 
point on the x axis, the disease is mild enough, or contained enough, and 
the vaccine’s safety is uncertain enough, that the interest in autonomy ex-
ceeds the imperative to intervene on behalf of individuals or on behalf of 
the population at large. To the right, the severity or contagiousness of the 
disease, or the vaccine’s safety, elevates the interests in beneficence, utilitari-
anism, justice, and nonmaleficence above respect for individual choice.
This general representation can be refined by considering the kinds of 
populations to which a mandate would apply. Three groups that warrant 
special consideration in this regard are children, health care workers, and 
members of the military. The interest of each in autonomy falls below that 
of members of the general public, although their positions relative to one 
another may be somewhat less clear.
kennedy institute oF ethiCs journal • june 2008
[  118  ]
The autonomy of children, from the perspective of ethics and law, is 
given less weight than that of adults, because they are not considered to 
have the same decision-making capability. As a legal matter, parents or 
guardians serve as children’s representatives regarding medical decisions, 
such as acceptance of a vaccine. Mandates aimed at children limit the dis-
cretion of parents and guardians in this role. Such restrictions may grant 
less respect to autonomy when the ultimate object is to protect the children 
for whom adults care rather than the adults themselves. Adolescents un-
der the age of 18, the target population for HPV mandate proposals, are 
considered children under the law. Their decision-making capacity clearly 
differs from that of younger children, but it is not at the same level as 
adults. Since parental judgment can take account of the preferences of this 
group, the case to overrule parents’ wishes with government mandates is 
less compelling than when younger children are involved.
Health care workers, it can be argued, voluntarily accept certain medical 
risks in choosing their occupation and thereby consent to restrictions on their 
autonomy in this regard. Possible hazards of a vaccination that is required to 
prevent the spread of a disease to patients are among these risks. Members of 
the military sacrifice significant amounts of autonomy as an integral part of 
their service. Among the elements of autonomy that they lose is the freedom 
to avoid the risk of personal harm when ordered to face a threat. This im-
pairment of autonomy limits the ability to decline medical interventions that 
are ordered through the chain of command, such as vaccination. In graphic 
representation, at any level of threat, respect for autonomy is lower for these 
groups, so the line representing this value moves to the left (Figure 2).
Figure 2. Autonomy of Selected Subgroups
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With regard to beneficence, the three groups follow different trajectories. 
Because they are less able to care for themselves than are adults, ethics 
recognizes a greater need to oversee the well-being of children. However, 
less beneficence is called for concerning health care workers and members 
of the military for similar reasons to those regarding their autonomy. In 
both cases, their occupations involve the acceptance of risks of harm in 
the interest of protecting the broader public. The importance of utilitarian-
ism as it affects the spread of a contagious disease is greater for all of the 
groups. Children are important vectors for many diseases, such as influenza, 
for both pediatric and adult populations. Health care workers can spread 
infectious agents to patients, and their ability to continue to work is crucial 
in the event of an epidemic. Depending on the circumstances, maintaining 
the health of members of the military may be essential to national defense. 
With regard to nonmaleficence, more caution is appropriate concerning 
steps that might harm the health of children than of adults, because of 
their greater level of helplessness and less developed capabilities for deci-
sion making. Less caution is called for regarding risks that might be faced 
by health care workers and members of the military.
When this set of contests between competing ethical values is synthesized 
into a single graph, the interest in autonomy can be seen to intersect each 
of the others at a different point (Figure 3). This produces varying inter-
cepts with the x axis, meaning that the amount of risk that would justify 
mandating a vaccine, either in terms of disease severity, contagiousness, 
or vaccine safety, differs in each case. The relative positions of the lines 
Figure 3. Competing Ethical Concerns in Combination
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for a population and for subgroups within it can be assessed based on 
relevant medical and epidemiological information.
The implication for policy debates is that they can be structured ac-
cording to the most salient underlying ethical concerns. In a systematic 
fashion, the graphic framework considers the target population for a 
vaccine mandate, key characteristics of the disease, its causative agent, 
the nature of the vaccine, and, perhaps most importantly, the underlying 
ethical value or values at work. The interplay of these factors tracks their 
relative importance to each observer, and it isolates the central points of 
disagreement. Policy debates may then produce more analytical, informed, 
and inclusive discourse.
THE CASE OF HPV VACCINE
The call to mandate the HPV vaccine offers an opportunity to apply 
the graphic framework in a practical context. Cervical cancer is a serious 
and often fatal disease that produced an estimated 9,710 new cases and 
3,700 deaths in the United States in 2006 (American Cancer Society 2006). 
Incidence and mortality are much higher in the developing world. The 
annual treatment cost in the United States is approximately $1.7 billion 
(Brown et al. 2002). However, early detection through Pap smear screen-
ing can reduce the mortality rate considerably, a factor that is partially 
responsible for a drop of almost 50 percent in the death rate between 1982 
and 2002 (National Cancer Institute 2006). The disease is contagious but 
only through sexual relations. Casual contact is not sufficient. Males as 
well as females can carry and transmit HPV, although a consequent clini-
cal pathology in males has not been definitively identified.
Autonomy concerns regarding HPV vaccination are particularly com-
plex. In addition to apprehension over possible side effects, some mandate 
opponents contend that offering protection against a sexually transmitted 
disease implies permission for, or at least acquiescence in, the behavior. At 
the least, it may interfere with family prerogatives concerning when and 
how to discuss sexual issues with children. Moreover, unlike diseases such 
as polio to which there is almost no defense in the face of a contagious 
patient, HPV transmission can be interrupted behaviorally through ab-
stinence, and even if it is transmitted, the risk to health can be controlled 
through regular screening.
The graphic framework balances the four ethical values that compete 
with the autonomy of schoolgirls and their families to make decisions 
regarding administration of the vaccine. Beneficence is compelled by the 
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potential severity of cervical cancer, but the case for its application to HPV 
is limited by the availability of alternative control techniques. The issue 
that it raises for policy is whether the incremental value of a mandate 
in preventing disease is substantially greater than that of less coercive 
measures that promote risk reducing behaviors and vaccination on a vol-
untary basis. Considerations of justice apply, because the vaccine’s cost, 
more than $300 for a course of three required doses, could limit access 
for those who are poor and uninsured. Nonmaleficence in relation to the 
HPV vaccine is respected when vaccine safety can be assured, which is not 
yet possible in terms of long-term effects. This value militates in favor of 
waiting to impose a mandate, perhaps by applying the two-years recom-
mended by the Institute of Medicine before accepting a new drug as safe. 
(The recommendation is contained in Committee on the Assessment of 
the U.S. Drug Safety System (2006).)
The most compelling ethical consideration that competes with autonomy 
in evaluating an HPV vaccine mandate is utilitarianism, in particular, 
the interest in controlling disease spread. Could a mandate, as opposed 
to the simple availability of the vaccine, significantly reduce the overall 
incidence of cervical cancer and the consequent burden to society in mor-
bidity, mortality, and financial costs? The answer to this question requires 
behavioral observations, epidemiological data, assessment of vaccine ef-
ficacy, and projections of vaccine costs. At one extreme, a small marginal 
effect produced by a mandate would position the interest in utilitarianism 
below that of autonomy, in other words toward the left-hand end of the 
x axis. At the other extreme, substantial medical and financial benefits 
could reverse this order and move the point of intersection to the right 
on the x axis. This would be the case if the benefits were comparable to 
those obtained by mandating vaccination against a devastating and highly 
contagious disease such as polio or, on a speculative basis, avian flu (see 
Offit 2005, pp. 4–18, for a discussion of polio).
Undoubtedly, the two sides in the debate would differ in their assess-
ment of where the lines representing autonomy and utilitarianism actually 
cross. What level of societal benefit could outweigh America’s cherished 
respect for individual autonomy and freedom from government coercion? 
This is a question of individual values that is not amendable to empirical 
resolution. What the graphic framework contributes is to focus the debate 
by highlighting the underlying causes of disagreement when all competing 
concerns are considered together.
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A FINAL REFINEMENT TO THE MODEL: HERD IMMUNITY
The ultimate utilitarian benefit from vaccine mandates is to reach the 
threshold percentage of vaccinated individuals necessary to achieve herd 
immunity. The implication of this effect for the graphic framework is that 
the trajectory of utilitarianism is not a straight line. At the point where 
the threshold for herd immunity is jeopardized, the community interest 
in coercing widespread vaccination rises precipitously. This increases the 
slope of the line, moving the point of intersection with autonomy to the 
left along the x axis (Figure 4). The result is that a lower level of disease 
severity would ethically justify a vaccine mandate because of the added 
benefit of herd immunity.
Figure 4. Utilitarianism and Herd Immunity
Herd immunity adds an important consideration to the analysis of the 
HPV vaccine. If it represents a realistic goal, then the case for making 
vaccination mandatory becomes considerably more compelling. The po-
tential to achieve herd immunity heightens the conflict between individual 
preferences and community interests, since the act of declining a vaccine 
could threaten the health of a large segment of the population, including 
some women who have been vaccinated (Fine and Clarkson 1986). The 
relative positions of the relevant ethical values change accordingly.
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CONCLUSION
The ethical analysis of vaccine mandates requires a delicate balance of 
cherished values. Americans prize their autonomy, but contrary communi-
tarian considerations at times intrude. In a legal context, the preamble to 
the United States Constitution recognizes that liberty may not be denied 
without due process of the law (United States Constitution, Amendment 
XIV), yet the Supreme Court recognized more than 100 years ago that 
individuals may be subject to manifold restraints such as vaccine mandates 
for the “common good” (Jacobson v. Massachusetts 1905. 197 U.S. 11). 
Public health ethics has just begun to struggle with the conflict between 
individual autonomy and vaccine mandates. The level of emotion involved 
may make the debate seem overwhelming, however a structured analyti-
cal model could make the clash of values more manageable. This is the 
contribution of a graphic framework that lays out significant competing 
concerns simultaneously.
The proposed framework could be refined further to account for ad-
ditional factors, for example a cost-benefit analysis that might affect 
utilitarian considerations. Even with refinements, discourse over sensitive 
issues of values will never be made entirely devoid of emotional charge. 
Nevertheless, by isolating the central considerations and displaying their 
interplay, this framework can facilitate more productive public discus-
sion. With a vaccine for HPV under current debate and active research 
underway for new ones to address scourges such as HIV and avian flu, 
the same conflicts promise to arise repeatedly for some time to come. 
Reasoned discourse concerning them is a prerequisite for the formulation 
of effective public health policy.
This work was developed in conjunction with the Center for Vaccines Ethics and Policy, 
a program of the Center for Bioethics at the University of Pennsylvania, The Wistar 
Institute Vaccine Center, and the Vaccine Education Center of Children’s Hospital of 
Philadelphia.
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